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3	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
4	COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
5	THE HONORABLE FRANK ROESCH, JUDGE
6	DEPARTMENT NO. 31
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9	ALAMEDA CREEK ALLIANCE, a non-profit California corporation,
10	Petitioner and Plaintiff,
11 12	Case No. RG11 579426 vs.
13	CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, and Does 1 through 20, inclusive,
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15	Respondents and Defendants. /
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17	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
18	U.S. POST OFFICE BUILDING 201-13th Street Oakland, California
19	JUNE 23, 2011
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21	<u>A-P-P-E-A-R-A-N-C-E-S:</u>
22	For Petitioner: LIPPE GAFFNEY WAGNER
23	By: BRIAN GAFFNEY, Attorney at Law 329 Bryant Street
24	San Francisco, California
25	For Respondents: CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LEGAL DIVISION
26	By: DEREK VAN HOFTEN, Deputy Attorney 595 Market Street, Suite 1700
27	San Francisco, California 94105
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1 THURSDAY - JUNE 23, 2011 MORNING SESSION 2 ---000---3 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 4 THE COURT: Alameda Creek Alliance versus 5 California Department of Transportation. б MR. GAFFNEY: Good morning, your Honor. Brian 7 Gaffney for petitioner Alameda Creek Alliance. 8 MR. VAN HOFTEN: Good morning, your Honor. Derek 9 Van Hoften, for the State of California, Department of 10 Transportation. 11 **THE COURT:** Let's address the demurrer as the first 12 item of business here. 13 MR. VAN HOFTEN: Your Honor, it's the respondent's 14 demurrer. 15 There's been a lot of paperwork filed on both 16 the demurrer and the preliminary injunction, but I think we 17 can distill down to the critical issues with respect to the 18 demurrer. It's very simply two points I want to make. One 19 is the applicable statute of limitations under CEQA is 180 20 days from the date of project approval. There's an allegation in the petition 21 THE COURT: 22 that Cal Trans never issued a notice of determination. 23 There's another allegation Cal Trans never formally approved 24 the project; another allegation Cal Trans never provided 25 notice to the public of project approval; another allegation 26 that this action -- and I'm quoting -- this action is timely under CEQA as it is filed within 180 days of project 27 28 commencement, and Cal Trans did not issue a notice of

determination for the project or otherwise formally adopt 1 2 the project. And that's the end of the quote. 3 How can a demurrer lie in the face of those 4 allegations? Really, how can a demurrer based on statute of 5 limitations have validity in the face of those assertions? б MR. VAN HOFTEN: Well, with respect to the first 7 point that there was no notice of determination filed --8 that's true. Cal Trans has made that concession. But CEQA 9 10 THE COURT: It doesn't matter whether you make the 11 concession or not. In a demurrer I have to accept all of 12 these allegations as true unless there is something that the 13 Court can take judicial notice of that says that it's not true. And in review of that the Court determines it's not 14 15 really an issue of fact whether it's true or not but that it's false as a matter of law. 16 17 MR. VAN HOFTEN: I understand, your Honor. And 18 that's why Cal Trans did request judicial notice of its 19 project report, which was signed, which constitutes the 20 project approval. I'm going to be taking judicial notice 21 THE COURT: 22 of every document everybody asked me to take judicial notice 23 of because there were no objections. 24 Okay. That being a fact in MR. VAN HOFTEN: 25 evidence for purposes of demurrer, the project wasn't 26 briefed. It was approved in 2006. Cal Trans --27 THE COURT: I read that. I see that as an issue of 28 fact.

MR. VAN HOFTEN: Okay.

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THE COURT: It's not clear as a matter of law that it was approved. It just isn't. So what you've presented to the Court is well, here's this contrary fact that we think is more valid than their alleged facts, but it doesn't necessarily as a matter of law undermine their allegation.

7 MR. VAN HOFTEN: Well, if it establishes that under 8 Cal Trans own rules the project was approved and under CEQA 9 an agency has discretion to determine how it approves its 10 projects under those rules, under the CEQA statutes and 11 guidelines that constitutes project approval when the 12 project was signed in 2006.

13 I looked at that. I've determined and THE COURT: 14 I think it's really clear that if that's an issue it's an 15 issue of fact whether your manual procedures were correctly 16 processed, whether they were completed. It's quite clear 17 that your manual requires that before the CEQA evaluation 18 can be completed they must file their notice of 19 determination. It's right in your manual. And I've read 20 your argument. It just seems to me that's not going to mean 21 a demurrer.

22 MR. VAN HOFTEN: I just want to reiterate -- well, 23 it sounds like the Court read this particular point. But 24 the manual doesn't say that the filing of an NOD is a 25 necessary step to confirm project approval. The manual 26 contemplates --

THE COURT: You mean, you can approve projectswithout doing CEQA review?

1 No, that's not what I'm saying, MR. VAN HOFTEN: 2 your Honor. 3 THE COURT: That is what you're saying. Because it 4 says that CEQA review -- I know I can find it if I take a 5 minute here. It basically says CEQA review is not complete 6 until the NOD is filed. 7 MR. VAN HOFTEN: The CEQA process is not complete 8 until the NOD is filed. 9 THE COURT: So Cal Trans would go forward on a project without completing a CEQA review of some kind? 10 MR. VAN HOFTEN: In this instance the Department 11 12 did not file the NOD. 13 THE COURT: Perhaps we're jumping forward before we 14 get there. But it would seem to me that what you're 15 actually saying to me is that we approved the project; we 16 didn't do CEQA review; they didn't sue within 180 days from 17 our project approval -- and so forth, so they have lost 18 their opportunity to file a writ of mandate. 19 MR. VAN HOFTEN: The project was approved in 2006, 20 and under CEQA that starts the running of the statute 180 days from that date, pursuant to the guideline section. 21 22 THE COURT: All right. 23 MR. VAN HOFTEN: And so independent of the failure 24 to file the NOD the statute begins running from that date. 25 And the Legislature contemplates a situation both where 26 there was no CEQA review and where an agency fails to file 27 an NOD. Well, the allegation in the petition 28 THE COURT: SHELETTE ROSS, CSR #12362

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1 says that Cal Trans never provided notice to the public of 2 project approval. That's an allegation. I have not seen 3 anything at all that says Cal Trans did provide notice to 4 the public of project approval in 2006.

5 MR. VAN HOFTEN: That's correct. But there was 6 also no requirement under CEQA that there must be public 7 notice of the project approval to trigger the statute of 8 limitations.

9 THE COURT: You couldn't have meant what I just
10 heard. Could you repeat that?

11 MR. VAN HOFTEN: Yes. CEQA does not require that 12 there also be public notice of project approval to trigger 13 the running of the statute of limitations. The guideline 14 sections --

15 THE COURT: Okay. Let me give you back what I'm 16 hearing you say. Cal Trans may approve a project through a 17 process that need not be disclosed to the public; yet, that 18 project approval commences a statute of limitations. Cal 19 Trans may then wait 180 days, and the CEQA 180 days' statute of limitations will then expire; and after that expiration 20 of the CEQA statute of limitations Cal Trans may advise the 21 22 public they have approved this project and that this project 23 is immune from CEQA attack by members of the public who 24 believe environmental review of the project was inadequate. 25 Is that what you are saying to me?

26 MR. VAN HOFTEN: I'm saying that the Legislature -27 THE COURT: That's a yes or no question.
28 MR. VAN HOFTEN: Well, some of the hypotheticals

and facts I've lost track of.

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THE COURT: Let me repeat them, because this is
pretty important in this instance.

4 What I've heard you to be arguing is that Cal 5 Trans can approve a project as it did this one in June of 6 2006; may keep that project approval secret for 180 days 7 thereby exhausting the statute of limitations which 8 commenced upon the approval of the project in June of 2006 9 in this case; so that in January of 2007 the statute of 10 limitations expired. And nobody outside of Cal Trans ever 11 had notice that this project has been approved.

12 MR. VAN HOFTEN: Yes -- if Cal Trans approved the 13 project consistent with its own rules for doing so, which it 14 did in this case.

15 **THE COURT:** I just can't believe that an entity of 16 the State can make that argument. We're going to cause you 17 an injury, and your statute of limitations is going to run 18 before you even know it. That's what you're telling me.

19 MR. VAN HOFTEN: I'm not telling you that Cal Trans 20 kept the project approval a secret, and I'm not saying that an affirmative attempt to keep the project approval a secret 21 22 necessarily triggers a statute of limitations in every 23 circumstance. What I'm saying is that in this circumstance 24 the project was approved. There was no formal public 25 hearing held to announce that, nor was one required. And if CEQA considers project approval in itself to constitute 26 public notice, there is no ancillary requirement that there 27 28 be a public hearing. There's also no ancillary requirement

that public notice be provided other than the NOD. 1 And 2 where the NOD is not filed the statute and the guidelines 3 specifically contemplate that situation provide that the 4 statute run from either project approval or commencement of 5 the project. 6 And in each of those instances the Legislature 7 determined that a project approval on its own with no 8 additional requirement of public notice triggers the 9 statutory 180-day notice. 10 THE COURT: How could anybody be put on notice if 11 the public isn't given notice? 12 MR. VAN HOFTEN: I don't know what the 13 Legislature's motivation might have been. 14 You think the Legislature would approve THE COURT: 15 the process of an in-house project approval that's not released to the public and let the statute of limitations 16 17 run before the public discovers that the project is going to 18 go forward? 19 MR. VAN HOFTEN: If project approval is conducted 20 consistent with that agency's practices in doing so, that's what the statute says -- that the approval, itself, is 21 22 considered constructive notice. 23 THE COURT: All right. Is there any other argument 24 that you want to make on the demurrer? 25 MR. VAN HOFTEN: It sounds like the Court is not 26 persuaded. 27 Honestly, I am utterly unpersuaded. THE COURT: Ι am astounded that the State of California would make that 28 SHELETTE ROSS, CSR #12362

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I am just blown away, and I'm entirely 1 argument. 2 unpersuaded that would undermine the facts alleged in the 3 petition that assert that the project did not commence until 4 a time within 180 days prior to this lawsuit being filed. 5 MR. VAN HOFTEN: Well, I would like to address the question of project commencement. Even if the 180-day 6 7 statute does not run from the date of project approval it 8 would run from the date of project commencement. The 9 petition alleges the project doesn't commence until --10 THE COURT: It says right in there it commenced in 11 February of 2011 with the topping of trees. That's the 12 allegation. 13 MR. VAN HOFTEN: Correct. And there are facts that the Court has now relevant to the demurrer that established 14 15 project implementation activities more than that and 180 16 days --17 THE COURT: What would that be? 18 MR. VAN HOFTEN: Issuance of quality certification. 19 THE COURT: You mean the one that said, we would 20 certify you but you have all these mitigations that you must 21 comply with? 22 MR. VAN HOFTEN: It was the -- the certification 23 was issued in June of 2010. I believe it did have terms and 24 conditions for satisfying the permit. 25 THE COURT: It had -- oh, I don't know, about 30 of 26 them or so. Most of them were mitigations. That would 27 normally be a document that doesn't mean the project 28 commenced, but rather you're setting up a notice of

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determination of some kind but pre-NOD work. At least,
 that's what I think it would be.

3 **MR. VAN HOFTEN:** I don't think that's always the 4 case in terms of chronology of when a certification is 5 issued relative to the project implementation status. But what I think is relevant is that CEQA doesn't define what б 7 project commencement is, and there is no authority to 8 support the argument that it can only be project 9 construction. And when viewing that concept of project 10 commencement --

11 **THE COURT:** Well, I don't disagree with that as a 12 general principle. There could be other indicators that the 13 project has commenced, but during your pre-notice of 14 determination process, to accumulate certifications from the 15 Regional Water Board or to accumulate a permit from the Fish 16 and Game Department -- those aren't commencements of the 17 project. That's the process to obtain environmental review 18 prior to the approval of the project, and I don't see how 19 anybody could ever evaluate that differently.

20 MR. VAN HOFTEN: Well, there were also public meetings held in the fall of 2010 about the schedule. There 21 22 was a California Department of Transportation hearing to 23 fund the project in 2010. All of these steps are steps for 24 project implementation, and the guidelines under CEQA are 25 that project commencement should trigger the statute of limitations because it provides constructive notice that the 26 agency is moving forward with the project. All those steps 27 28 provide constructive notice that the agency was notified

before --

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THE COURT: Is a move forward that appears on its face to be one of environmental review prior to actually establishing some kind of a determination and then filing the NOD -- would that be enough to trigger a statute of limitations based upon the concept that the project has commenced?

8 MR. VAN HOFTEN: You're asking, your Honor,
9 specifically about during the environmental process?

10 THE COURT: Well, look. The typical way that a 11 project goes forward is that the agency will ask somebody to 12 produce a scoping plan and then a draft environmental impact 13 report and then send out the draft environmental impact 14 report for public comment; and I would want to know whether 15 sending out a draft environmental impact report is a 16 commencement of a project. Because given the certification 17 of the Water Board should be actually something that 18 precedes sending out a draft environmental impact report --19 and probably what should be included in a draft 20 environmental impact report particularly, so when it has a laundry list of mitigations that the Water Board would 21 22 require --

23 MR. VAN HOFTEN: I think -- no. Typically when 24 you're in the environmental review process those steps in 25 and of themselves are not project commencement.

THE COURT: Then why would a precursor to that environmental review be an indicator of project commencement?

1 In this case it was not precursor. MR. VAN HOFTEN: 2 In a declaration filed in 2006 the Department of Fish and 3 Game --4 So you're saying it's a question of THE COURT: 5 fact here whether that Water Board certification was in fact commencement of the action or not? 6 7 MR. VAN HOFTEN: I think that it's a question of 8 fact whether that in addition to all of the other steps 9 documented that Cal Trans took constitutes project 10 commencement within the meaning of that term under the guidelines of the statute, and that there's nothing to 11 12 support --13 So as a matter of law I should discount THE COURT: 14 statements in the petition and find that they are not true 15 as a matter of law? 16 MR. VAN HOFTEN: Which statements are you referring 17 to, your Honor? 18 THE COURT: The statement that the petition in the 19 action was filed within 180 days of the project 20 commencement. MR. VAN HOFTEN: I think the facts in evidence now 21 22 contradict that allegation in the petition, because it 23 demonstrates it. 24 THE COURT: But the question in demurrer is whether 25 it's conclusive as a matter of law. That fact is contradicted. 26 27 **MR. VAN HOFTEN:** I think it's conclusive as a 28 matter of law in light of the additional evidence that is

now before the Court that contradicts the allegation that it 1 2 commenced before March of 2011. THE COURT: All right. Is there any more argument 3 4 you'd like to make? 5 MR. VAN HOFTEN: No, that's it. 6 THE COURT: I'm not going to ask you for argument. 7 The demurrer is overruled. The petition when 8 read just within its four corners and the facts that the 9 Court can take judicial notice of are sufficient to state a cause of action and have complied with statute of 10 11 limitations. It is not clear as a matter of law that the 12 statute of limitations are violated here. It may be an issue of fact, but that will be an issue left for the trier 13 of fact at the time of the merits hearing. 14 15 We're going to take a ten-minute recess and come back and do the preliminary injunction. 16 17 (RECESS.) 18 THE COURT: We're back on the record In the Matter 19 of Alameda Creek Alliance versus Cal Trans. 20 Mr. Gaffney, this is your application for 21 preliminary injunction. Do you wish to make argument? MR. GAFFNEY: Yes, I do, your Honor. If there's 22 23 anything specific you'd like me to address please let me 24 know. We've tried to be comprehensive in our papers that we 25 have a likelihood of success on the merits. The only thing that has been addressed is the statute of limitations, and 26 then there's our allegation of the CEQA time constraints. 27 Beginning with the statute of limitations, 28

1 your Honor, it seems there's no notice of determination, and 2 there's no dispute that there's been no notice to the 3 public. Our position is, as the Court recognizes, that 4 notice to the public is absolutely essential to start any 5 statute of limitations. Cal Trans in their papers point to 6 a signature on a project report cover and says that this 7 constitutes the approval of the project. And they point to 8 a CEQA guideline, 15352, that states that approval of the 9 project is pursuant to its rules, regulations and 10 ordinances. Our argument is that first off under the project manual, itself, the approval comes after the 11 12 preliminary sign-off. 13 They have cited to the section of their manual under the preliminary sign-off, and under the next section, 14 15 which is the approval section -- they still haven't 16 completed it. Because that process is that a State project 17 approval is given by the district director after the final 18 environmental document is approved by Cal Trans; and if 19 required after the final environmental document and project 20 design feature, the CEQA environmental process is completed and Cal Trans as lead agency approves a project and files a 21 22 notice of determination. 23 So they haven't -- under their own definition

24 they haven't approved the project yet. Instead what they 25 approved is the sign-off.

26 Our other argument is that their procedure 27 manual is in violation of the APA, Administrative Procedure 28 Act, because it's a general rule of applicability, and it

1 doesn't fall within the internal management exception. 2 Therefore, the Court should give it no weight. And our 3 argument in that regard is that it's generally applicable, 4 because as they've argued in their papers, this is the 5 approval process for all approvals in California. Their 6 manual, itself, says that it pertains to CEQA compliance. 7 They argue here specifically that it is the manual that 8 should pertain to the rights of citizens with regard to CEQA 9 and trigger any approvals. It's not just internal 10 management. 11 In contrast, the document that they also ask 12 for judicial notice of is their signature policy, and that 13 signature policy does appear as internal management. It 14 says how you sign it, who signs it. This procedure manual 15 applies to a class of people, including petitioners who may 16 be CEOA litigants. 17 There has been no APA compliance. They don't 18 contest that they have. Instead their position is there 19 doesn't need to be. We believe they're wrong and that under the law and Armistead and the other cases we've cited the 20 Court is to give their procedure manual no weight and that 21 22 it's void ab initio. 23 So that's our argument with regard to statute 24 of limitations, which is there has been no formal project 25 approval, there has been no notice of determination and

THE COURT: -- that there has been no official 27 28 notice of determination, wouldn't it?

therefore --

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MR. GAFFNEY: Under their project manual their 1 2 approval process would be sufficient if they had filed notice of determination. 3 4 THE COURT: Okay. And if they filed a notice of 5 determination it wouldn't be underground regulation. б MR. GAFFNEY: The procedure manual still may be an 7 underground regulation because of its general applicability 8 and the fact that it hasn't gone through the APA process. 9 THE COURT: Okay. MR. GAFFNEY: The issue that was raised in demurrer 10 11 by Cal Trans we've alleged, and we have facts to support --12 THE COURT: We're done with the demurrer. 13 MR. GAFFNEY: I understand. 14 THE COURT: We can talk about probability of 15 success. 16 MR. GAFFNEY: Okay. 17 THE COURT: Because we're talking about whether or 18 not a preliminary injunction should issue. 19 MR. GAFFNEY: So if I've satisfied the Court's 20 questions with regard to statute of limitations... Regarding the probability of success we've 21 22 pointed to the fact that all they've done here is a negative 23 declaration, and there was evidence before them of potential 24 significant impacts under the fair argument standard that 25 should trigger an EIR. As the Court knows --THE COURT: Mr. Gaffney, I'm not sure that this is 26 a neg-dec case. I'm not sure whether it's a mitigated 27 I'm not sure that it's a no-dec case of -- I 28 neg-dec case.

just don't know.

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2 MR. GAFFNEY: I understand, your Honor. It's our 3 assessment that it is a mitigated negative declaration 4 despite what they've called it. Because the document that 5 they called the final document acknowledges impacts and 6 acknowledges the need for mitigations for those impacts and 7 that would make it a mitigated negative declaration.

8 **THE COURT:** But their documents don't commit to 9 finding mitigations.

10 MR. GAFFNEY: They don't have a mitigation monitor 11 reporting plan, and that's our second CEQA claim. Our first 12 being there is substantial evidence of significant impacts 13 in the form of expert opinion from the Fish and Wildlife 14 Service, we think -- we went on that, and that's grounds 15 enough for the Court to issue a preliminary injunction. Our second thing we also think we win on is there was a need for 16 17 a mitigation and monitoring plan because there was a 18 mandatory finding of significance. Because in their 19 document they mention mitigations for Wetlands, for Oak Woodlands -- for I think visual esthetics, and yet there's 20 nothing. There's no mitigation monitoring reporting plan, 21 22 and that's essential under CEQA to make sure it's more than 23 just promises that's actually enforceable.

So we think we have two solid claims, particularly given the standard of review of the fair argument standard for why we win under CEQA. And then that leaves us to the balance of harms.

On one hand the Court has not one but two

threatened species -- the red-legged frog and the Alameda 1 2 whipsnake. In addition, the declaration of Sean Smallwood 3 who went out to the site, who has a background in surveying 4 for frogs and for education -- he opines --5 THE COURT: He didn't see any frogs. 6 MR. GAFFNEY: -- he didn't see any frogs. 7 **THE COURT:** He said this is great habitat for them. 8 MR. GAFFNEY: Right. And I don't think he would 9 have to see a froq to reach a decision about irreparable 10 harm. He lays out the --11 THE COURT: It always occurs to me that my backyard 12 would be a great habitat for the three-toed sloth, but there 13 aren't any back there. But it would still be a great 14 habitat. That doesn't mean that in my view something needs 15 to be done in my backyard to protect the three-toed sloth. 16 MR. GAFFNEY: Well, I don't know that the agency is 17 contemplating a highway in your backyard. 18 THE COURT: I hope not. They haven't published 19 anything. 20 AUDIENCE: You never know. MR. GAFFNEY: So if the Court's concern is that a 21 22 scientist's sworn declaration needs to be based upon 23 observance of a frog let me address that, because I don't 24 think that's the case. 25 Smallwood went out with that background and he 26 said this is the sort of habitat that would have frogs. The biological opinion -- and we've pointed to the particular 27 28 pages -- says that presence of frogs is likely, that this is

1 the type of frog habitat. And Smallwood says for the frog
2 he believes there's an immediate and irreparable harm posed
3 by the project. And he believes for the Alameda whipsnake
4 it's more likely than not that there's immediate harm to the
5 snake.

6 So against that harm to the species of 7 immediate and irreparable harm, by similar background we 8 have the claims that somehow there's going to be some sort 9 of injury to the public safety. In that regard we would 10 note that in the negative declaration there is some evidence 11 regarding injuries and fatalities. There's been no 12 fatalities.

13 We had a declaration by Mr. Vincent Bacon 14 (PHONETIC), who reviewed the documents including the 15 negative declaration, who reviewed the attachments; and it's his opinion that if the project goes forward it's likely 16 17 that there could be greater safety risks because it 18 increases the speed. He also opines the need for an EIR, 19 because an EIR would allow discussion for alternatives such as median strips, slower speed limits -- et cetera. He also 20 points out particular elements of the safety table that's 21 22 provided by Cal Trans, and he points out that some of the 23 accidents didn't even occur within the structure of the 24 project; that some of the accidents were related to alcohol, 25 which is going to happen and not related to the 26 intersection.

27**THE COURT:** I am familiar with the intersection of28Paloma and Niles Canyon Road and 84. I've turned left at

Paloma hundreds of times. It is an unsafe intersection. 1 2 I've never approached that intersection without a heightened level of caution worried about cars in front of me before I 3 4 cut across the road, because there's not much of a stretch 5 in front of there. It curves around under -- I think that's б a railroad bridge, and I was always on a heightened level of 7 caution. And I was also worried about cars behind me, 8 because there's no left-turn pocket there.

9 It is beyond any doubt in my mind a dangerous 10 intersection, and it's a balancing question whether the 11 danger at that intersection would have to carry more weight 12 than whatever environmental possibilities that might occur 13 that you've outlined. But make no mistake that's a 14 dangerous intersection.

15 MR. GAFFNEY: And I would concur, your Honor, from 16 my own personal knowledge that that particular turn you're 17 talking about is a dangerous intersection. And Alameda 18 Creek Alliance is not asking the Court to disregard safety 19 concerns for human beings. What we are saying is that we're likely to succeed on the merits here, and when the Court 20 balances the harms -- this is the project they put out to 21 22 the public in 2005. Six years later they all of a sudden 23 start commencing without public notice. What the Alameda 24 Creek Alliance is seeking is environmental review.

We can be before this Court on the merits in a few months, and what we seek here is what we think we're entitled to in equity -- is a preliminary injunction, so that the project construction doesn't push forward until

CEQA's been complied with.

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THE COURT: Yes, sir.

3 MR. VAN HOFTEN: Your Honor, the judgment issue is 4 that petitioner can't completely establish a prevailing on 5 the merits that tips in their favor. In this case б respondent Cal Trans is likely to prevail on the merits. 7

THE COURT: Why?

8 MR. VAN HOFTEN: Largely because of the statute of 9 limitations issue we've discussed before. And in the 10 preliminary injunction context I understand --

11 THE COURT: You mean, in the demurrer context. 12 MR. VAN HOFTEN: Right. We discussed it in the 13 demurrer context.

14 **THE COURT:** We've all heard that whole argument. 15 MR. VAN HOFTEN: Right. We don't need to revisit 16 the argument about triggering the statute in 2006. Even 17 putting that aside there is significantly more evidence and 18 more facts in evidence in the context of the injunction than 19 in the four corners of the petition that establishes that 20 the petitioner was aware of the project underway of the 21 project commencement.

22 THE COURT: Yeah. The petitioner kept sending 23 emails saying what are you doing here.

MR. VAN HOFTEN: And Cal Trans --

25 THE COURT: And get no response. Nobody ever 26 responded saying this project was approved back in 2006, what are you bothering us for. 27

MR. VAN HOFTEN: Cal Trans did respond, and they

1 responded including emails in 2009, 2010 which included a 2 project information sheet, which included the project 3 schedule, which included the date the negative declaration 4 had been finalized.

5 **THE COURT:** What good is it if a negative 6 declaration is finalized and it's not filed?

7 MR. VAN HOFTEN: It is relevant in terms of putting 8 the public and putting petitioner on notice that the agency 9 is proceeding with the project. And that, if nothing else, 10 triggers the running of the statute. Not only did the 11 Department respond including a project information sheet 12 explaining the project schedule, there were public meetings 13 held.

As I mentioned before, the 401 certification 14 15 included an expressed reference to the fact that the negative declaration had already been finalized. 16 The 17 Department of Fish and Game had filed a notice of 18 determination, which put the public on notice that a 19 negative declaration had been adopted for the project. That was filed in June 2010. 20

All these facts and all this evidence demonstrates awareness on the part of petitioner and the public that the project was underway, that the project had commenced and that the negative declaration had been finalized.

THE COURT: Well, you're not entirely correct about one of those facts. You say to me that the certification from the Regional Water Quality Control Board stated that

the negative declaration had been finalized. Well, in fact 1 2 they got it wrong. It says that it had been filed. The 3 Water Board was under the belief for some reason that you 4 had filed your negative declaration. That's not true. You 5 had not filed your negative declaration. Had you filed your б negative declaration we wouldn't be here today. 7 But you can't bootstrap yourself by saying 8 well, we fooled the Water Board because we approved a 9 negative declaration but we never filed it. They thought 10 you had filed it. 11 MR. VAN HOFTEN: I understand the distinction. 12 THE COURT: I don't know if you understand that 13 distinction. I don't know why you're arguing that point. MR. VAN HOFTEN: I don't know that it fits within 14 15 the context of the evidence of the fact that the project was underway. And I think the notice of determination that Fish 16 17 and Game filed, which stated that the negative declaration 18 had been approved for the project, also put the public on 19 notice in June 2010 that the project was underway. Petitioner, themselves --20 21 THE COURT: Approval is entirely different from 22 filing. 23 It is, but it is evidence of MR. VAN HOFTEN: 24 project commencement. So for statute of limitations 25 purpose, if at the latest the statute begins to run 180 days before project commencement, all this evidence demonstrates 26 27 that the project commenced long before March of 2011. And the public meetings Cal Trans held with cities in the County 28

of Alameda in the fall of 2010 where they discussed the 1 2 project -- petitioner, itself, acknowledges that it became 3 aware that the project was proceeding in the fall of 2010 4 and yet trying to advance the argument here it didn't know 5 about it and the statute couldn't have begun to run. So in terms of the likelihood of prevailing on the merits for the 6 7 statute of limitations ground is that the petitioner was 8 aware that the statute began to run more than 180 days 9 before they filed that petition.

10 Beyond the statute of limitations petitioner 11 also hasn't established and can't establish that it's likely 12 to prevail on the merits with respect to its argument that 13 the negative declaration the Department prepared was 14 insufficient. It advances two main arguments, and they both 15 stand from the biological opinion. Those are ones that Fish 16 and Wildlife determined that the project is likely to have 17 adverse impacts on species, but that doesn't necessarily 18 establish that there is, in a CEQA context, a significant 19 impact to the species. The two are not harmonious.

21 MR. VAN HOFTEN: The determination by Fish and 22 Wildlife, the opinion that there may be adverse effects to 23 species --

Say that again.

THE COURT: Protected species.

25 MR. VAN HOFTEN: Yes -- may not be established in a 26 CEQA context that there will be a significant impact to the 27 environment.

THE COURT: Does it raise a fair argument?

THE COURT:

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SHELETTE ROSS, CSR #12362

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1 MR. VAN HOFTEN: By itself it did not, and the 2 Department determined that it did not. 3 THE COURT: How could you argue that? Fish and 4 Game says maybe the Alameda whipsnake is going to be harmed 5 by this construction and the species is listed as a б protected species. Doesn't that create a fair argument of 7 significant environmental impact? 8 MR. VAN HOFTEN: I think what's more relevant is 9 the ultimate conclusion and the biological opinion, which is that it would not jeopardize the species with the special 10 11 terms and conditions that were included. 12 THE COURT: So as long as it won't make the species 13 extinct there's not significant impact on the environment. 14 Would that be your position? 15 MR. VAN HOFTEN: No. 16 THE COURT: Well, that's what I heard you say. 17 MR. VAN HOFTEN: It's not that it has to rise to a 18 level of extinction in this context based on --19 THE COURT: No, it doesn't. I would agree with 20 that, but an impact is an impact. 21 MR. VAN HOFTEN: Well, it's not equivalent. 22 Determination that something is likely to affect a species 23 in a biological opinion context does not necessarily 24 establish a fair argument of significant impact in the CEQA 25 context. THE COURT: 26 You are very wrong about that. 27 MR. VAN HOFTEN: All right. I'd like to move on to 28 the question of the battle of harms. I think it can be

1 characterized as speculative in terms of the irreparable 2 harm to the species. There has been nothing documented that 3 the impending activities will necessarily irreparably harm 4 the species.

5 **THE COURT:** This is a CEQA case. It has nothing to 6 do with the ultimate result. This has to do with whether 7 there should be a review of the environmental situation 8 prior to moving forward. It's a process case, it's not an 9 ultimate result case. CEQA is in general a process case.

10 MR. VAN HOFTEN: I'm referring though, your Honor, 11 to the preliminary injunction, establishing the question of 12 irreparable harm and the need for injunction now versus a 13 hearing on the merits for CEQA.

14 **THE COURT:** If I can take the liberty to explain 15 what I think Mr. Gaffney's position is, that this might 16 cause harm to the Alameda whipsnake, a protected species --17 CEQA requires that you not move forward until you've 18 investigated that. The irreparable harm is that you are 19 moving forward without investigating that possibility and 20 there may be a possibility of that harm that is indeed 21 irreparable harm.

22 MR. VAN HOFTEN: As I understood the argument the 23 irreparable harm was not something moving forward without 24 CEQA review, which is for two species, specifically for 25 constructive activities is imminent. And I think the two 26 are distinct, and petitioners haven't established that it is 27 likely absent an injunction.

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THE COURT: All right. Anything more that you'd

1 like to argue? 2 MR. VAN HOFTEN: Nothing more. 3 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Gaffney. 4 MR. GAFFNEY: Two points, your Honor. With regard 5 to the presence of the species there is evidence before the 6 Court. The Miller declaration includes the biological 7 opinion at page 27 -- talks about local sighting, and 8 Exhibit 3 to the Miller declaration is 2001 technical 9 memoranda. And at page 30 it talks about local sightings of 10 the frog within one to two miles of the project site. 11 THE COURT: The professor from Davis didn't see 12 them. 13 **MR. GAFFNEY:** Didn't see them -- you're right. As 14 the Court recognizes, the biological opinions, mitigations 15 are of no relevance, because they haven't been incorporated into the CEQA document. There's additional harm here, we 16 17 argue, that hasn't been mentioned although the Court alluded 18 to it -- the harm to the public environmental review. 19 I've been doing CEQA for a long time, and I 20 found a quote in preparing which I have never quite seen it 21 put in this context. And that is, from a public policy 22 standpoint the Court said that compliance with the EIR 23 provisions of CEQA serves a more important function than 24 providing the public with a project's affect on the 25 environment; and that is, demonstrating to an apprehensive 26 citizenry that the responsible public agency has considered the ethological effects and that it makes officials 27 28 accountable for their environmental values. I never noticed

1 that before. I thought that it was an interesting take on 2 the importance of the EIR process. 3 If the project moves forward, then whatever 4 the merits or potential merits -- we think they're strong. 5 Alameda Creek Alliance CEQA claims will be moot. So that's 6 our argument as to additional harms to the species. 7 THE COURT: All right. He raised some new 8 arguments. Do you want to respond to those? 9 MR. VAN HOFTEN: With respect to the claims being moot, I just want to touch on that point. They will not be 10 moot in the absence of a preliminary injunction. 11 The 12 relevant question goes more to --13 THE COURT: You mean, you're not going to go 14 forward with the project if the preliminary injunction is 15 not granted? MR. VAN HOFTEN: Construction will begin, but it 16 17 will not result in irreparable harm that petitioner alleges. 18 THE COURT: I didn't follow you. 19 MR. VAN HOFTEN: The project will begin on its construction schedule, but it will not --20 THE COURT: When do you envision the administrative 21 22 record in place so that this case could be set for hearing? 23 MR. VAN HOFTEN: I think we could have a record in 24 place within 30 days. 25 THE COURT: That's probably a good idea 26 irrespective of which way the decision goes today. 27 All right. Is there anything else you'd like 28 to argue?

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1	MR. VAN HOFTEN: No, your Honor.
2	THE COURT: Final words on your part.
3	MR. GAFFNEY: No, your Honor.
4	THE COURT: All right. The preliminary injunction
5	will be granted. There is sufficient evidence to indicate a
6	likelihood of success in this matter on the petitioner's
7	side. I will send out an order on both the demurrer and on
8	the preliminary injunction.
9	As far as a bond is concerned a bond may be
10	posted for \$10,000.
11	MR. GAFFNEY: Your Honor, can we address that?
12	THE COURT: Go ahead.
13	MR. GAFFNEY: Alameda Creek Alliance is a nonprofit
14	association.
15	THE COURT: Well, they have to buy the bond. How
16	much does that cost?
17	MR. GAFFNEY: I don't know, your Honor.
18	THE COURT: Well, I think that's the minimum bond
19	that any insurance company will issue.
20	MR. GAFFNEY: We would ask that the Court consider
21	a minimal or no bond because of the fact that the nonprofit
22	organization may not be able to raise the funds to cover the
23	bond.
24	THE COURT: All right. You wish to make argument
25	on the amount of bond?
26	MR. VAN HOFTEN: Only that Cal Trans believes a
27	bond is significant and it's appropriate and that's between
28	zero and \$10,000. It's urgently insignificant.
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1	THE COURT: Hearing the State on that issue bond
2	will be waived.
3	MR. GAFFNEY: Thank you, your Honor.
4	THE COURT: I'll send out an order.
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6	(PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED.)
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